In this episode we re-argue the Supreme Court case Colorado v. Connelly.
A man walked up to a police officer who was minding his own business and announced that he wished to confess to a murder. The police repeatedly informed him of his rights, and he insisted upon making his statement. It turned out this man was experiencing acute symptoms of mental illness.
The question before the court: did taking FC’s statements and using them as evidence against him violate the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment?
Facts of the Case
This episode’s case begins one day on the street outside a courthouse in Denver, Colorado, where a gentleman named FC walked up to a uniformed police officer, stuck out his hands, and asked to be arrested.
The officer asked FC why he wanted to be arrested, and FC allegedly responded, “I killed someone.” When the officer asked FC to explain further, FC said that he had stabbed a 14-year-old girl to death several months prior, and described where in the city he had done so. At this point, the officer read FC his rights, handcuffed him, searched him for weapons, and called for a detective to come to the scene.
While waiting for the detective to arrive, FC was informed by the officer again that he did not have to talk to the police. Undeterred, FC described more details about the victim, including her name, her age, and that they had traveled to Denver from Boston together. FC even offered to take the officer to the location of the alleged murder.
In response, the officer asked FC if he was currently under the influence of alcohol or drugs, but FC reported that he was sober. When asked if he had ever been treated for a mental illness, FC confirmed that he had in fact been hospitalized 5 times.
When the detective arrived, he requested that FC return with him to police headquarters for questioning, and FC agreed. At police headquarters, FC was once again read his rights, and once again choose to discuss the murder. In the ensuing interview, FC repeated much of what he had said on the street, as well as added some additional details about the incident, including how he and the victim had traveled by bus from Boston together before getting into an argument that led FC to stab the girl.
FC made good on his offer to take the officers to the scene of the crime, directing them from a police vehicle through the city and to an alley. It was in this same alley several months earlier that the body of a 14 year old girl with multiple stab wounds had been discovered.
Following FC’s interview, the police conducted a full investigation, including traveling to Boston to prove the identity of the victim and the connection between her and FC. Through their work they found the family of the young girl, positively identified her clothing, her name, and her disappearance, confirmed a match of her dental records, and confirmed with FC’s family that he and the girl were seen together at a family function. With this corroboration of FC’s story, he was formally charged with the crime of second degree murder.
While the police were investigating in Boston, FC was hospitalized at a state mental hospital. It turns out that before the end of the day on which he admitted to the murder, he had to be restrained and treated by a psychiatrist in the jail. In a meeting with a public defender, he was considered delusional and confused. FC described hearing the voice of God that commanded him to confess. After an examination, FC was ruled to be incompetent to stand trial and committed to the Colorado state mental hospital.
It wasn’t until 5 months later that a doctor at the hospital opined that FC was once again competent to stand trial. Ahead of the trial itself, FC’s lawyers filed a motion to suppress his statements to the police on the day he confessed to the murder, arguing that his mental illness meant that he was not capable of making a voluntary admission, which meant that his confession was in fact involuntary. They further argued that since the confession was involuntary, admitting it into evidence would violate FC’s due process rights.
The officer and the detective testified that FC did not present to them as a man in the throes of a mental illness. They noted that he was neatly dressed, spoke normally, and appeared to be in control of himself. They followed all of their procedures, including reading FC his rights numerous times, thus giving him multiple opportunities to remain quiet.
The psychiatrist at the state psychiatric hospital testified that FC had reported hearing the voice of God demanding that he confess to the murder. He flew back to Denver that night, following the command of the voice in his head. FC stated that he was not actually interested in confessing and had gone to the airport a few times with the intent of returning home. It wasn’t until the voice told him to confess or kill himself, that FC chose to confess. From here FC reported that he followed the commands of the voice, including sending his remaining money home to his mother, which his mother confirmed she received. As a result of FC’s story and his mother’s corroboration, it was the opinion of the psychiatrist that FC suffered from schizophrenia, which caused command auditory hallucinations. While FC could function normally most of the time, he didn’t have a choice in confessing.
Ultimately the trial judge ruled that FC’s statements were not given voluntarily because they were not the result of his free will, and so they could not be entered into evidence and used against him in court. Furthermore, any evidence collected as a result of FC’s statements, also needed to be suppressed. This includes basically everything.
Since this ruling essentially obliterated the prosecution’s case, they appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court, but the trial court’s decision was upheld. Undeterred, the prosecution once again appealed, this time to the United States Supreme Court.
Ruling of the Relitigated Justices
Click here to show how the Relitigated justices ruled on the case…
Votes By Party
Colorado
3
Argued by Jarret
v.
Connelly
0
Argued by Nikki
Votes By Justice
Chief Justice Adam
Colorado
Justice Mike
Colorado
Justice Graham
Colorado
References
Barrowcliff, A.L., & Haddock, G. (2010). Factors affecting compliance and resistance to auditory command hallucinations: Perceptions of a clinical population. Journal of Mental Health, 19(6), 542-552.
Braham, L.G., Trower, P., & Birchwood, M. (2004). Acting on command hallucinations and dangerous behavior: A critique of the major findings in the last decade. Clinical Psychology Review, 24, 513-528. DOI: 10.1016/j.cpr.2004.04.002
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
Colorado v. Connelly (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved January 12, 2025 from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-660
Gehring, M.E. (1988). Colorado v. Connelly: The demise of free will as an independent basis for finding a confession involuntary. Villanova Law Review, 33, 895-923. [https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2615&context=vlr]
Harkins, D. (2012). Revisiting Colorado v. Connelly: The problem of false confessions in the twenty-first century. Southern Illinois University Law Journal, 37, 319-336. [https://law.siu.edu/_common/documents/law-journal/articles-2013/winter-2013/3-harkins-article.pdf]
Melton, G.B., Petrila, J. Poythress, N.G., Slobogin, C., Otto, R.K., Mossman, D., & Condie, L.O. (2018). Psychological evaluations for the courts: A handbook for mental health professionals and lawyers (4th ed.). Guilford.
Pizzi, W.T. (2009). Colorado v. Connelly: What really happened. Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, 7, 377-389. [https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/faculty-articles/268/]
Rogers, R., Nussbaum, D., & Gillis, R. (1988). Command hallucinations and criminality: A clinical quandary. Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law, 16(3), 251-258.